The New Mineral Scramble: What Greenland Reveals About Critical Resources and Global Power
Countries are scrambling for critical minerals with an intensity that feels like a more sophisticated, and potentially more volatile, industrial revolution. In 2024-25, competition among great powers for these resources has reached its most active period in decades. Greenland and the recent U.S.–NATO tension symbolise this well. Countries are ready to stray from history to claim enough of what they need—minerals.
Why the urgency? Modern technology—military weapons, clean energy systems, defence platforms, AI chips, semiconductors—all depend on critical minerals for manufacturing. These innovations have become proxies for state power. What makes extracting them so highly competitive is that these minerals are (mostly) fixed in specific geographic locations, each containing a single mineral type. For example, 70% of cobalt supplies come from the DRC. In comparison, over 80% of rare earth refining occurs in China, meaning most countries must maintain favourable relationships with China and diversify their alliances to avoid a stranglehold on refining capability in one state's hands. The result? An explosion of transactional diplomacy, with the U.S. leading the charge.
The most high-profile example of mineral diplomacy was the US-Ukraine minerals deal signed on 30 April 2025. The deal secured the establishment of a joint investment fund for the reconstruction of Ukraine, using (in part) the future revenues from natural resource extraction (minerals). The pattern repeated in Africa. In June 2025, the DRC asked the U.S. for military support against the M23 Rebellion in exchange for increased access to its strategic minerals. In Trump's November 2025 national security strategy, it explicitly prioritises "securing access to critical supply chains and materials." This is the era of mineral diplomacy.
But producer countries are pushing back. Academic research published in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications examined 261 cases of resource nationalism since 1990 and found that rising mineral prices are the primary trigger for contemporary resource nationalism. Such examples include Zimbabwe, which, in 2024 they banned unprocessed raw lithium exports after saying the country was losing out on €1.7 billion in revenue from exporting unprocessed material rather than the batteries it is used to manufacture. Such a strategy is not only to secure local value addition but also to ensure fairer prices rather than extraction monopolies by great powers.
In response to the varied conditions of this new reality, mineral-rich middle powers such as Indonesia and Brazil are adopting "multi-alignment" policies to promote rules-based trade, potentially protect themselves from great-power coercion, and diversify critical mineral supply chains.
Greenland condenses every political trend into one contested territory: critical minerals, energy transition competition, anti-China supply chain strategy, and economic coercion as geopolitical leverage. Yet the recently resolved U.S. threats to "take over" Greenland reinforced a concept often dismissed in this era of realism and declining rules-based order—the strength of alliances. What makes Greenland so valuable? It ranks roughly eighth globally in rare-earth reserves, with potential to host the world's second-largest deposits after China, pending further exploration. It also holds extensive stores of germanium and gallium; two minerals China banned from U.S. sale in late 2024, which likely intensified American interest despite the risk to NATO relations.
But there's a catch. Because rare earth concentrations in Greenland are relatively low-grade, professionals predict that at least a decade will pass before extraction becomes viable. Moreover, since China controls roughly 90% of global rare earth refining, Greenland's minerals would still need to flow through Chinese infrastructure—meaning anyone with access to Greenland's deposits needs positive relations with China, at least until alternatives develop. Greenland's minister of business and mineral resources has warned that while Western partnerships are preferred, insufficient investment may force consideration of other partners, including China. This suggests that nationalist attitudes toward resources may be forcing major powers like the U.S. to either collaborate or deepen imperialist impulses.
Because of their low grades of rare earths, experts predict it will take at least a decade before these resources become useful. Moreover, because China controls around 90% of global refining capacity (a near-monopoly), Greenland's minerals would need to pass through China's infrastructure. Meaning that anyone with access to minerals in Greenland needs a positive relationship with China—at least in the short term until alternatives are developed.
What makes Greenland's position even more critical is climate change. The Arctic is warming four times faster than the rest of the planet, exposing natural resources and opening shipping routes—including shorter paths between Asia, Western Europe, and the U.S. Greenland sits at the gateway to the Northern Sea Route, which has seen growth driven primarily by Russia-China trade over the past two years. Greenland is only increasing in value for modern trade; any attempt by a single partner to control it would completely restructure how states source the tools necessary for innovation.
By reframing the U.S. threat to Greenland as a threat to NATO, Denmark demonstrated a crucial truth: in an era of absolutisms and resurgent imperial ambitions, strategically aligned smaller powers can be greater than any single state. In an era dependent on global trade for state innovation, we must be willing to work together to subvert any attempt to monopolise innovation.
References
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