Peas in a pod! (Populism and modern politics)
Reconciling with economic and cultural change as a society, particularly after a global financial crisis or a major technological innovation, inevitably engenders widespread fear. Fear of what’s to come next, fear of ever rebounding from the ruins that have been left by so much dispossession or forced lifestyle change. We feel abandoned by our leaders, distrust in their decision-making – after all, how did we get here? Animalistically, we cling to what we have like a caveman without fire, looking for warmth. Patience for a change in circumstances is for the lucky, for the already warm—not for the people still fighting hypothermia.
In times like this, we crave disruption in our politics. This is a collective behaviour familiar to most democratic nations. Whatever the style the population is used to in any specific country, disruption manifests as the rise of a politician who, in many ways, personifies its antithesis.
Populism is defined by its vagueness. It is a style of politics that isn’t confined to one particular ideology or political party and can be used by any group. Often, populism is a magnetic vehicle for the rise of disruptive politics. This is because at its core, it holds the ‘people’s will’ as its guiding doctrine. It constantly reiterates the values of the common person, claiming to represent ‘common sense’ and ‘fair’ values. ‘The people’ is held at odds with the perceived ‘elite’ - those causing alienation from a fair life and holding their own interests far above and in place of ‘the people’s’. Populist politics is emotional in its style and framing of issues. In times of distress, it is remarkably effective for this reason, as it can draw people in by promising to represent them fairly. Communicating these ideals (subject to specific customisation to the movement's ideology) often relies on the politician's enigmatic charisma. It is this person who will draw attention to the movement and guide the public perception of it. In our current attention economy, characterised by global collective technological dependence and immersion into the social media sphere, these movements rapidly grow on social media. The algorithm does much of their recruiting work for them by favouring attention-grabbing, antagonistic posts with relatable figureheads.
The type of person defined as being a part of ‘the people’, will vary between movements. Often, this is where the polarising effect of populism lives. Some leaders take the position that ‘the people’ should exclude a particular religious, ethnic, racial, gendered, economic, or social group. Often, followers feel comfortable joining these groups because they claim to be for the ‘common folk’. The people who classify themselves as a part of the group feel seen, emotionally fulfilled, and the rest of the qualities of the movement that might be offensive to others eventually take a back seat in their minds. This group may hold hostility towards excluded groups, including the perceived ‘elite’. This attitude is what cultivates an ‘us vs. them’ tone in the discourse within these movements. Ironically, criticism of it can often feed loyalty to the movement, as loyal followers will feel they were right to distance themselves from these groups.
These are defining features of populism, some of which are described in its more extreme form. But as noted, populism doesn’t have to serve a certain ideology. So, in that same notion, in the right circumstance, populism could be used for a positive purpose. Since the GFC in 2008, populist leaders in countries like the U.S., U.K., France, and Australia have most often represented right-wing ideologies. From Nigel Farage in the U.K. to Marine Le Pen in France, from Pauline Hanson in Australia to Donald Trump in the U.S., these leaders have taken anti-immigrant, anti-government, anti-establishment, and anti-social healthcare stances in varying conservative and discriminatory severity. What is disillusioning is the fact that some who vote for them perceive themselves as a part of ‘the people’ when they are actually not. The message of being for the people is a sweeping statement that in implementation is lost. These movements are also sometimes in denial of who ‘the people’ actually are today —immigrants, government workers, or any minority —which ends up being a characteristic of the movement's followers in some way.
In countries where the populist leader has won, the other side can often snarl and assume that time will reveal the true colours of this populist leader, that they will practically vote themselves out. Except in the age of social media, this is an impossibly inept attempt at a viable solution for a representative government to emerge out of the ruins of this movement. These leaders will remain popular so long as they are skilful communicators of the issues that are truly affecting the (self-perceived) dispossessed population. The security of their power is reinforced by the fact that the other parties cannot communicate in the same skilful manner as them, able to plainly address the issues that have been glossed over for too long, while articulating them in a manner emotionally true to most of the voting population.
In the age of the 10-second clip and the three-second hook, the best communicator wins. The medium is online videos, and the artist is the magnetic orator. Populations have been dispossessed and online for so long that the leader would have to be caught outrightly in a lie, directly in contradiction to the issues they ran on before the dispossessed population forced them out. Political parties that wish to be inclusive and do better must take note of the effective loyalty populist style of politics brings.
Whilst exclusionary in nature, populist politics doesn’t always have to be driven by hate or fear. There is room for a different type of populist politics, one that has an actual inclusionary conception of ‘the people’, and a productive scope of the ‘elite’ to which it aims to reform. We cannot reject the change of our media system. That opportunity is long gone. Politicians, alternative movements, and parties can only have a fighting chance when they take on similar strategies of engagement with the majority (particularly in states currently at the mercy of their populist leaders, such as the U.S. and Argentina). The undeniable watchability of a leader promising a better future, coupled with authenticity and capability, will always be more interesting to a voter, encouraging them to engage more.
In the U.S., some democratic leaders have begun to take form after their Republican counterparts. The meteoric rise of Zohran Mamdani in the Democratic primary for New York City mayor and California State Governor Gavin Newsom’s recent social media presence have both been the most formidable forces of online democratic engagement among voters in the U.S. in the past 6 months. These successes can be accounted for because of their populist styles – their clear definition of ‘elite’ or ‘them’, their watchability and charisma, their acknowledgement of dispossession, and their fierce stature. These politicians are utilising populist style politics to harness the unavoidable reality of our mediascape, providing a popular base in their constituencies to fight discriminatory alternatives.
Left-wing politicians must adopt a media-friendly style if they are to contend with right-wing populist leaders. The voting population in these countries is obviously attracted to characteristics of a populist style political environment. This is true both in the U.S. and other countries that have been culturally spellbound by the populist style. Nuance is key, details and responsible, representative government will never by definition be dictated by a thoroughly populist politics. But the concept of accepting populist style politics is really an extension of accepting the reality: the extent to which politics today exists within and must be born from the online media environment. Particularly in a society that is craving reliable leadership to navigate these unprecedented circumstances, a little charisma wouldn’t hurt.